Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

Todd Wayne Mulder, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. State of Utah,
Defendant/Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Mulder vs. State of Utah, No. 20140642 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3304

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20140642-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
1'0DD W AYNE MULDER,

Petitioner/Appellant,
V.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief, in
the Fifth Judicial District, Washington County, the Honorable
G. Rand Beacham presiding

TODD MULDER

Utah State Prison
Inmate #17817-B
OQ 2-218-B
P .O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84070
Appellant Pro Se

RYAN D. TENNEY (9866)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

Counsel for Appellee
Oral argument not requested

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUNO 8 2015

Case No. 20140642-CA
JNTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
TODD WAYNE MULDER,

Petitioner/Appellant,
V.

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief, in
the Fifth Judicial District, Washington County, the Honorable
G. Rand Beacham presiding
RYAN D. TENNEY (9866)

Assistant Attorney General

D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6 th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
SEAN

TODD MULDER

Utah State Prison
Inmate #17817-B
OQ 2-218-B
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84070

Appellant Pro Se

Counsel for Appellee
Oral argument not requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................................. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES ...................... 4
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 5
Trial .............................................................................................................. 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 12
I~

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 15

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
CLAIM BECAUSE MULDER'S PROFFER PRESENTED MERE
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO
PREVENT A REASONABLE JUROR FROM CONVICTING
MULDER .......................................................................................................... 15
A. Additional procedural background ....................................................... 16
B. The district court correctly granted su1nmary judgment on this
claim because Campbell's affidavit was mere impeachment
evidence and would not make it so that no reasonable juror
could co11vict ............................................................................................. 18
1.

This was mere ilnpeachment evidence .......................................... 1.8

2. Mulder's proffer failed as a matter of law to establish that
no reasonable juror could have convicted Mulder. ...................... 1.9
IL APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE TO

NOT ARGUE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT ASKING FOR A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ABOUT
THE ACCOMPLICES' TESTIMONY ........................................................... 23

-i-

A. To prevail, Mulder would have been required to prove
ineffective assistance of both appellate and trial counsel. .................. 24
B. The district court correctly denied this claim, where Mulder
was not entitled to the cautionary instruction at issue ....................... 27
III. APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE NOT
TO ARGUE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT ARGUING THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY
PRESENTED FALSE TESTIMONY FROM LORI SCHLEGEL. ................ 30
IV. APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE NOT
TO ARGUE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT (1) QUESTIONING PROSPECTIVE JURORS ABOUT
RELIGION OR (2) ARGUING THAT THERE WAS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION OF NON-MORMONS
FROM THE JURY ............................................................................................ 34

A. Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
h·ial counsel should have asked jurors about religion........................ 34
B. Appellate counsel had no basis for arguing that there was an
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury ............... 39
V. APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE NOT

TO ARGUE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
PASSING FOUR JURORS FOR CAUSE ...................................................... 42

A. To prevail, Mulder was required to prove that there was no
plausible reason for counsel's decision to not move to strike
each juror, as well as that each juror was actually biased .................. 42
B. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Lois Dainack. ....... 46
1.

Mulder did not prove that Dainack was actually biased ............. 46

2. Mulder also has not de1nonstrated that his counsel had no
plausible reason for wanting to keep Dainack on this jury ......... 53
C. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Kris Gubler ........... 54
1.

Mulder did not prove that Gubler was actually biased ............... 55

-11-

2. Mulder also has not demonstrated that his counsel had no
plausible reason for wanting to keep Gubler on this jury ........... 58
D. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Shawna
Holt ...................................................................................................... 59
E. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Susan
Decorsey .............................................................................................. 60
VI. APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE NOT
TO ARGUE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT SUBPOENAING ADDITIONAL ALIBI WITNESSES ..................... 61
VII.APPELLATE COUNSEL COULD REASONABLY DECIDE NOT
TO ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE
APPOINTED SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL. ..................................................... 65
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 67
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 68

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
Addendu1n B:

PCR 561-70

Addendum C: Affidavit of Daniel Campbell
Addendum D: Smith/Diepen Letters

-111-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .................................................................. 41
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10 (2013) ......................................................................... 26
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) .............................................................. 26
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) ....................................................................... 25
Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2002) ............................................. 32
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .......................................... 26, 43, 44
Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) ..................................................... 32
United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1989) ...................................... 32
United States v. Dejesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) .......................................... 41
~

United States v. Heron, 721 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2013) .......................................... .41
United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1978) ..................................... 32
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) ....................................... .45
STATE CASES

Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, 267 P.3d 232 ........................................ 16, 17, 46
~

Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960) .............................. 16
Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1991) ............................................. 25
Coggeshell v. State, 2011 UT App 375,265 P.3d 818 ........................................... 47
Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, 71 P.3d 601 ........................................ 36, 37
Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32,279 P.3d 396 .............................................................. 24
Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19,342 P.3d 182 .................................................. 4, 7, 8, 10

-IV-

Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1988) ........................ 36
In re C.C., 2002 UT App 149, 48 P.3d 244 ............................................................ 66
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, 52 P.3d 1168 ........................................................ 21, 22

Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, 194 P.3d 913 ..................................................... 25, 31, 40
Larsen v. Davis Cnty., 2014 UT App 74, 324 P.3d 641 .................................. 32, 33
Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank, FSB, 2008 UT 69, 199 P.3d 898 ............. 18, 19
Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40,344 P.3d 581 .............................................. 26, 32, 37
Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, 290 P.3d 921 ............................................ 24
Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, 293 P.3d 345 ................................................................ 24

Gi.J

State v. Arriaga, 2012 UT App 295, 288 P.3d 588 ................................................ 45
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) ............................................................... 36
State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, 322 P.3d 697 ................................................................ 25
State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) ............................................. 49, 50
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1994) ............................................. 49, 50
State v. Bryant, 2012 UT App 264, 290 P.3d 33 ................................................... 27
State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 256 P.3d 1102 ........................................... 36, 38
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162 ................................................................ 44
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989) ................................................. 43, 47, 48
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) ...................................................... 26, 41
State v. Flores, 2015 UT App 88, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 ................................... 36
State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1994) ................................................. 32
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1993) ............................................ passim

-v-

©

State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, 95 P.3d 302 ........................................... 29, 30
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, 131 P.3d 202 ...................................................... 43, 45, 51
State v. Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, 46 P.3d 761 ................................................ 29
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 .............................................................. 33, 35
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 .................................................... passim
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382 .............................................................. 65
~

State v. Mulder, 2009 UT App 318 ................................................................... 11, 18
State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, 253 P.3d 1082 ............................................ 27, 39, 55
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988) ........................................................... 29

.,;;)

State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987) ................................................ 65
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994) ....................................... 43, 47, 56
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976) ..................................................... 63, 64
State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557 (Utah App. 1996) .................................................. 58
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983) ................................................. 56, 57, 58
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) .................................. 49, 50, 51
State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 27 P.3d 573 ................................................. 66
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. ~998) ................................................... 65
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 24 P.3d 948 ........................................................... 50, 56
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278 ........................................................ 58
Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 156 P.3d 739 ...................................................... .45, 54
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-7 (West 2004) ......................................................... 27, 28
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102 (West 2009) ........................................................... 24

-vi-

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104 (West 2009) .................................... 4, 16, 18, 19, 22
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106 (West 2009) ...................................................... 4, 24
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 (West 2009) ............................................................ 1
Utah Constitution Art. I Sect. 4 ............................................................................ 36
STATE RULES

Utah R. Crim. P. 18 ................................................................................................ 42
Utah R. App. P. 24 ..................................................................................... 49, 61, 68
Utah R. App. P. 27 ................................................................................................. 68
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 ................................................................................................... 16
Utah R. Civil P. 65 .................................................................................................. 16

-vii-

~

Case No. 20140642-CA
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
TODD WAYNE MULDER,
Petitioner/Appellant,
V.

STATE OF UTAH,

Re span.dent/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Todd Wayne Mulder appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he collaterally challenged his convictions for
murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated§ 78A-3-102(3)G) (West 2009).

INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 2003, Daniel Campbell walked into a coin store in

St. George, shot the owner in the chest, bound him, and then stole coins and
1noney from the store's safe. The owner later died from his wounds.
Months later, police learned that Todd Mulder helped plan the
robbery, was Campbell's getaway driver, and shared in the robbery
proceeds.

A jury convicted Mulder of 1nurder, aggravated robbery, and

aggravated kidnapping, and this Court affirmed those convictions on
appeal.
Mulder then filed a post-conviction action collaterally challenging his
convictions. The dish·ict court below denied all of Mulder's claims on
summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

At trial, Campbell and another accomplice both testified about

Mulder's role in the crimes. In his post-conviction petition, Mulder argued
that he was entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence- namely,
an affidavit from Campbell in which Campbell claimed that Mulder had
nothing to do with the crime. The dish·ict court granted summary judgment
on this claim, reasoning that this was mere impeachment evidence and
would not make it impossible for a reasonable jury to have convicted.
Was this ruling correct?
2. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not
arguing that trial counsel should have requested a cautionary jury
instruction about the accomplices' testimony. The dish·ict court granted
r-,

~

summary judgment, reasoning that Mulder was not entitled to such an
instruction under the governing statute.
©

Was this ruling correct?
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had proffered no specific evidence about who those witnesses were or what
they would have said.
Was this ruling correct?
7. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel should have argued that
h·ial counsel improperly prevented Mulder from presenting his preferred
vJ

defense. The district court granted summary judgment on this because the
record shows that trial counsel presented the very defense that Mulder
requested.
Was this ruling correct?

Standard of Review: Review is for correctness. See Honie v. State, 2014
UT 19, if 28,342 P.3d 182.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are reproduced in Addendum A:
•

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104 (West 2009);

e

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 (West 2009).
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3. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not
arguing that the trial prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. The
district court granted surmnary judgment on this claim because Mulder had
proffered no evidence showing that the testhnony at issue was false or that
the prosecutor knew of its alleged falsity.
Was this ruling correct?
4. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not
arguing that Mulder's trial counsel should have asked prospective jurors
about their religious affiliation. The district court granted summary
judgment, reasoning that there was no legal basis for asking those questions
in this case.
Was this ruling correct?
5. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not
arguing that Mulder's trial counsel should have moved to strike four jurors.
The district court granted summary judgment, reasoning that there was no
basis for sh·iking any of them.
Was this ruling correct?
6. Mulder claimed that his appellate counsel should have argued that
h·ial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing additional alibi witnesses.
The district court granted sum1nary judgment on this claim because Mulder
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Underlying Crime
In the fall of 2003, Todd Mulder was living with his girlfriend Lori
Schlegel. R253:115. At the time, Mulder was on parole after serving a
lengthy prison sentence for armed robbery. R255:558-59.
Schlegel lived off a small monthly disability check. R253:115. She
also made money helping Mulder commit burglaries. R253:115-16. This
didn't amount to much, though, and Mulder and Schlegel still "needed
money." R255:610. Schlegel and Mulder decided to sell a set of coins that
Schlegel had obtained, so they took her coins to the Allgood Coin Shop in
St. George and met with Jordan Allgood, the shop's owner. R253:118-19.
After spending two days going through the coins, Allgood paid cash for the
coins. R253:120, 122. While they were there, Schlegel noticed that Allgood
had reh·ieved the cash from a safe behind his counter and had left the safe
unlocked. R253:122.
In early November 2003, Mulder had a chance 1neeting with Daniel
Campbell, whom he knew from a prison stint in Nevada. R253:171. At the
time of this 1neeting, Campbell had recently absconded fron1 a courtordered halfway house and was on the run. R253:125-26, 173.
1

The State will cite to the record fro1n the criminal case (case no.
051501050) as R-' and the record from the post-conviction case as PCR_.
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Campbell began spending time at Schlegel and Mulder's aparhnent.
R253:126-27, 384; 255:564.

While Campbell was there one day, Schlegel

mentioned the Allgood Coin Shop and said that Allgood was "sitting on a
gold mine." R253:128.
Campbell and Mulder decided to rob the coin shop.

Campbell

suggested that he and Mulder enter the store together, but Mulder pointed
out that Allgood would "know [him]" because he had been inside the store
several times. R253:186. They agreed that Campbell would rob the store,
while Mulder would act as the getaway driver. R253:186, 193.
The two obtained a wig and coat for Campbell to use as a disguise.
R253:138. They also obtained walkie-talkies to communicate, as well as duct

tape and handcuffs to restrain Allgood. R253:137, 200. Campbell wanted to
carry a stun gun, R253:137, 182, but Mulder insisted that Campbell use a
pistol that Mulder had recently obtained.

R253:183, 196.

Mulder also

instructed Campbell to "be a lion" when he went inside- i.e., to "go in and
be forceful, take control of the situation immediately." R253:202.
On November 24, 2003, Mulder, Campbell, and Schlegel drove to
Mesquite, Nevada, in Schlegel' s truck, and checked in together at a local
hotel under Schlegel' s na1ne. R253:142-43. The next morning, Campbell put
his disguise on in front of Mulder and Schlegel. R253:143. Mulder and

-6-

Campbell then drove to St. George. R253:144. Mulder dropped Campbell
off a short distance from the coin store. R253:215.
Campbell entered the store and began "screaming and yelling."
R253:217. Allgood was on the phone at the time. Id. When Allgood looked

at Campbell "kind of funny," Campbell shot him once in the chest.
R253:217-19.

Campbell wanted to make sure that the wounded Allgood

could not interfere with the robbery, so he handcuffed Allgood's hands
behind his back. R253:220.
As expected, the safe was unlocked. Id. Campbell loaded two duffel
bags full of coins and money, radioed Mulder that he was ready to be
picked up, and left. R253:222-23. When Campbell got inside the h·uck, he
told Mulder that he had shot Allgood in the shoulder. R253:224. Mulder
told him not to call 911. R253:225. Allgood died a short time later. R263:33.
Mulder drove Campbell back to the hotel romn and then divided the
coins and money. R253:248-49. As part of their share, Mulder and Schlegel
received two cougarans, which are one-ounce gold coins, as well as "'lots of
silver coins." R253:148, 150.
Two days after the robbery and 1nurder, Mulder and Schlegel went to
a pawn shop in Las Vegas to sell one of the cougarans.

R253:154, 253;

254:376. Campbell approached them unannounced in the parking lot and
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told them that he had sold a cougaran at that same pawn shop earlier that
day. R253:156, 253. Mulder was concerned that this would attract attention.
R253:156. He offered Campbell $3000 for the coins that Campbell still had

from the robbery. R253:158, 255. Mulder told Campbell to "take the $3000
and get out of here. We don't want to ever know who you are, we don't
want to see you again." R253:158. Mulder also said: "Man, you need to
watch your back and you need to keep your mouth shut." Id.
In the months following this crime, Campbell and Mulder were both
reincarcerated on different offenses, but officers had not linked them to the
Allgood murder. R. 263: 53-55, 68, 74-75. In October 2004, officers received
a tip that Campbell had confessed his involve1nent in this crime to a fellow
inmate and that Campbell had also implicated a former cellmate named
"Todd" and "Todd's" girlfriend. R263:55-62.
Officers followed up on this lead and were ulthnately led to Todd
Mulder, Campbell, and Schlegel. During subsequent interviews, Ca1npbell
and Schlegel both adrn.itted their involve1nent in the crime, and both of
them claimed that Mulder was involved in its planning and execution;
when interviewed in jail, however, Mulder denied that he was involved.
R253:164-66, 266; 263:72-73, 75.
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Trial

Mulder was charged with murder, aggravated robbery,

and

aggravated kidnapping. Rl-3.
At trial, Schlegel and Campbell both testified and implicated Mulder
in the crime. The State also introduced a video of the shooting taken from

the coin shop's security camera.

R263:37-38.

It showed Campbell

approaching the store's door after the shooting and "motioning out to
someone" outside.

R263:50.

In addition, the State presented evidence

showing that Schlegel had paid for a room in Mesquite the night before the
crime, as well as a receipt showing that Mulder had sold a gold coin at a Las
Vegas pawn shop two days after the homicide. R254:376.
Mulder also agreed to a stipulated set of facts that acknowledged
Campbell's role in the robbery and shooting, Campbell's prior relationship
with Mulder from prison, and that Mulder and Schlegel had purchased
Campbell's remaining coins after the shooting. R174-76.
Mulder testified in his own behalf.

In his testimony, Mulder

acknowledged having been in Allgood' s shop several times with Schlegel,
as well as hearing Schlegel refer to it as a "gold 1nine." R255:556-61. He
also acknowledged having met up with Ca1npbell a few weeks before the
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robbery, as well as being with Schlegel and Campbell when the idea of
robbing the Allgood store came up. R255:565.
Mulder clahned, however, that it was Schlegel' s idea to rob the store
and that she had black1na:iled him into participating in the planning.
R255:572, 621.

He acknowledged that he helped Campbell obtain the

disguise and that he watched Ca1npbell don it that morning, but he claimed
that he did so only because of Schlegel' s blackmail. Id.
Mulder denied doing anything else with respect to the robbery or
shooting. According to Mulder, Campbell drove off alone to rob the coin
shop, while he spent the morning attempting to sell stolen jewelry in
Mesquite. R255:573, 581, 583-94, 610. Mulder claimed that when Ca1npbell
returned, Ca1npbell and Schlegel divided the stolen coins together without
his participation.

R255:599. On cross-exa1nination, however, Mulder

admitted that he received some of the resulting proceeds through Schlegel,
that he pawned a gold coin two days after the robbery, and that he
purchased Ca1npbell' s remaining coins. R255:605, 631-32.
The jury convicted Mulder on all counts. R213-16.
Direct appeal

Mulder's appellate counsel raised two claims on direct appeal: first,
that h·ial counsel should have argued that the aggravated kidnapping
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@,

n1erged into the aggravated robbery; and second, that trial counsel should
have moved to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge for insufficient
evidence. State v. Mulder, 2009 UT App 318 at *1 (unpublished). This Court
rejected both claims. Id. at *1-3.
Post-Conviction

On August 25, 2010, Mulder filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
Mulder raised 29 claims, most of which alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective.

See generally PCR29-121. He also alleged that his appellate

counsel was ineffective for not raising those claims on appeal. PCRl 19. In
addition, Mulder alleged that he was entitled to relief based on newly
discovered evidence. In support, he proffered an affidavit from Campbell
in which Campbell recanted some of his trial testimony. PCR78-91.
The district court directed the State to only respond to the appellate
ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence claims. PCR170-71,
290-91. The State moved for summary judg1nent on all claims. The later
court granted the State's 1notion. PCR561-70 (Addendu1n B). In its written
ruling, the court noted that because it was "persuaded ahnost entirely" by
the

State's arguments,

it

would

"not indulge

in

much

analysis

of the issues." PCR561-62. The court instead "provide[d] only" a brief
"summary of the issues" and the basis for its rulings. PCR562.
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Mulder appeals the denial of his petition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Mulder sought relief under the PCRA' s newly discovered

evidence provision.

He relied on an affidavit from Daniel Campbell in

which Campbell recanted his trial testimony, now claiming that Mulder had
nothing to do with this crime.
The district court correctly ruled that the proffered testimony failed as
a matter of law to support post-conviction relief based on newly discovered
evidence. First, Campbell's recantation would be mere impeachment
evidence that does not justify post-conviction relief. Second, a reasonable
juror could still vote to convict Mulder, either by disregarding Campbell's
recantation, or even by disregarding Campbell's testimony entirely and
convicting based on Schlegel's testimony and the other evidence.
Point II: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

not arguing that trial counsel should have requested a cautionary
instruction about the weight that should be given to the testhnony of his
accomplices.
The district court correctlv concluded that the claitn failed as a matter
J

of law. The conh·olling statute requires such an instruction only when an
individual accomplice's testimony is uncorroborated. That is not the case
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here, where Campbell and Schlegel corroborated each other, and where
their joint account at trial was partially corroborated by Mulder's own
testimony and by other physical evidence.
Point III: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel should have
argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting false
testimony from Schlegel.

Mulder relies on a change in Schlegel' s

testimony-namely, at the preliminary hearing, Schlegel said that she had
not seen Mulder with a gun, but at trial, she said that she remembered
seeing Mulder with a gun several weeks after this crime.
To prevail on this claim, however, Mulder must point to evidence in
the record showing both that the evidence was false and that the prosecutor
knew of its falsity. The record does not prove either of these things. Thus,
there was no basis for appellate counsel to have raised this claims.
Point IV: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
not arguing that trial counsel should have asked jurors about their religious
affiliation.

But under conh·olling law, such questions would have been

appropriate only if religion were "clearly relevant" to this case. It was not
here, because the events in question did not take place in a church, implicate
a church, and no witness or actor's religion was ever mentioned to the jury.
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Mulder also argues that his appellate counsel should have argued
that his trial counsel was somehow complicit in ensuring that non-Mormons
were not seated on this jury. But nothing in the record supports this clailn.
To the contrary, the record shows that neither counsel nor the court were
aware of jurors' religious affiliation, let alone involved in an effort to
exclude members (or non-members) of any religion from the jury.

Point V: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
not arguing that h~ial counsel should have moved to strike four jurors for
cause. But in each instance, the record shows that juror in question was not
actually biased against Mulder. Because of this, Mulder has not shown that
he was prejudiced.
Moreover, to overcome the presumption of effectiveness in this
context, Mulder must prove that a juror's bias against him was so strong
that his counsel could not have had any plausible countervailing subjective
preference for keeping the juror. In this case, however, all of the jurors in
question were cmnpetent to serve, and several gave answers in voir dire
that were potentially favorable to Mulder's position. The district court
therefore correctly concluded that Mulder did not carry his burden.

Point VI: Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
not arguing that trial counsel should have subpoenaed additional alibi
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witnesses. But nothing in the record identifies who the additional witnesses
could have been or what they could have said to support Mulder's alibi.
Thus, there was no basis for appellate counsel to have made this claim, nor
is there any proof that Mulder was prejudiced by its absence.
Point VII: Finally, Mulder claims that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel should have been removed
based on an unwillingness to present Mulder's desired defense. But the
trial record shows that Mulder was allowed to present the very defense he
desired. Thus, there was no prejudicial error.

ARGUMENT
I.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on the
newly discovered evidence claim because Mulder's proffer
presented mere impeachment evidence that was not enough
to prevent a reasonable juror from convicting Mulder.

Mulder first argues that the district court erred in granting the State's
request for summary judg1nent. on his newly discovered evidence claim.
Aplt. Br. 17-22.
Under the PCRA, a petitioner is entitled to relief if he presents newly
discovered evidence that

II

is not 111erely ilnpeachment evidence" and,

"viewed with all the other evidence ... den1onstrates that no reasonable
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trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty" of the underlying
offense. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iii), (iv) (West 2009).
A district court must grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). Summary judgment
serves a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it eliminates the time,
trouble and expense of a trial, when upon the best showing the plaintiff can
possibly make, he would not be entitled to a judgment."

Brandt v.

Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960). Summary judgment
on behalf of the State in a post-conviction case is entirely appropriate. Rule
65C(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly contemplates it, and Utah
appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed grants of sum1nary judgment in
such cases.

See, e.g., Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ,I49, 267 P.3d 232

(" courts rule on sum1nary judgment motions in PCRA cases all the time").
A. Additional procedural background.

Mulder sought post-conviction relief based on newly discovered
evidence. In support, he submitted an affidavit from Daniel Campbell in
which Can1pbell attested that "Mulder was irn1ocent of all charges" and that
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he had previously "lied about [Mulder's] involvement." Campbell Affidavit. 2
Campbell also claimed that he had "trick[ed]" Mulder and Schlegel uinto
going to Mesquite, Nev. under false pretenses." Id. He claimed that on the
day of the murder, he dropped Mulder off at a shopping complex, and that
Campbell then "went to St. George and did the armed robbery . . .
completely alone." Id.
The district court denied the claim. It first noted the possibility that

this may have been impeachment evidence-and therefore incapable of
satisfying the PCRA's newly discovered evidence standard. PCR564. But
the court declined to rule on that basis. Instead, it held that, when "viewed
with all the other evidence," Campbell's post-conviction proffer "certainly"
would "not demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact would find
[Mulder] guilty."

PCR565.

The court noted that Campbell's affidavit

conh·adicted both his trial testimony and Mulder's trial testimony. See id.
The court also noted that Campbell's recantation "would have little
credibility because Daniel Campbell would clearly be admitting that he lied
under oath at Petitioner's first trial." Id. The court also noted that the jury

2

This affidavit was attached as one of the attachments to Mulder's
petition, see PCR78, but the district court did not include Mulder's
attachments in the appellate record. Mulder has also attached this affidavit
as Attachment C to his brief. The State will cite to it as Campbell Affidavit.
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would still have had Schlegel' s testimony and physical evidence that
hnplicated Mulder. Id.

B. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this
claim because Campbell's affidavit was mere impeachment
evidence and would not make it so that no reasonable juror
could convict.
1. This was mere impeachment evidence.
Although the district court declined to rule on whether this was mere
impeachment evidence, this Court can- and should - affirm on this basis.

See Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank, FSB, 2008 UT 69,_ ~26, 199 P.3d 898
("When reviewing a decision made on one ground, we have the discretion
to affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is apparent in the
record." (emphasis omitted)).
Here, Campbell's post-conviction account merely contradicted a
separate account.

If he had smnehow given it before trial, its only use

would have been to impeach his trial testimony. As noted, however, the
PCRA precludes relief where the newly discovered evidence is "merely
impeachment evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iii). Because of
this, Mulder was not entitled to relief and this Court may affirm on this
alternative basis alone.

-18-

@

2. Mulder's proffer failed as a matter of law to establish that
no reasonable juror could have convicted Mulder.
To succeed on this claim, Mulder also had to establish that if the
newly discovered evidence is "viewed with all the other evidence," "no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty" of the
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iv). There are several reasons
why Campbell's affidavit falls far short of this.
First, a jury could choose to disbelieve it. As noted, Campbell's new
account conflicts with the sworn testimony that he gave at trial. Thus, at
most, this affidavit creates a credibility contest between Campbell (now)
and Campbell (before).

But a jury could rationally choose to believe

Campbell's earlier account, rather than his new one, so this affidavit does
satisfy the conh·olling standard.
Second, this affidavit also conflicts with the account Mulder gave at
trial. As noted, Campbell now takes full responsibility for this crime. He
asserts that he "lied about [Mulder]' s involvement in 1ny crin1e" at trial and
claims that he "h·ick[ed] Mulder" and Schlegel "into going to Mesquite,
Nev. under false pretenses." Campbell Affidavit. Campbell thus claims that
he "did it completely alone." Id.
But this is not what Mulder said at trial. At trial, Mulder testified that
it was Schlegel, not Campbell, who was the mastermind and driving force
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behind this crime. Mulder testified that it was Schlegel who first brought
up the idea of robbing the coin shop.

R255:565.

Mulder testified that

Schlegel blackmailed him into participating. R255:572-73. Mulder testified
that Schlegel provided the money for obtaining a wig and fake beard.
R255:576. Mulder testified that after Campbell returned from the robbery,
Schlegel and Campbell divided the proceeds equally between them.
R255:599. Mulder thus claimed that this crime "was her baby." R255:619.
Thus, if Campbell's recantation were introduced at a retrial, it would
not necessarily exonerate Mulder.

Rather, it could actually undermine

Mulder's defense by contradicting his own sworn version of what
happened.
Third, the jury could also still convict based on Lori Schlegel' s
testimony, wherein Schlegel testified that Mulder actively and voluntarily
participated in the planning and execution of this crhne.

See generally

R253:129-48.
Notably, other sources-including Mulder himself-corroborated
1nuch of Schlegel's account. For example, Schlegel testified that Mulder and
Cainpbell obtained the disguise for Campbell to use in the robbery; Mulder
acknowledged this.

R255:610.

Schlegel clahned that Mulder watched

Campbell put on the disguise the morning of the murder; Mulder
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acknowledged this. R255:611. Schlegel claimed that Mulder and Campbell
left that morning in her truck; Mulder acknowledged this.

R255:610-11.

Schlegel claimed that when Mulder left, he told her that he was going to St.
George to assist Campbell in the robbery; Mulder acknowledged this.
R255:627-28.

Finally, Schlegel claimed that, two days after the robbery,

Mulder pawned off one of the stolen gold coins at a pawn shop; Mulder
acknowledged this. R255:631.
Unlike Mulder and Campbell, Schlegel does not have a long history
of convictions for crimes of dishonesty. Thus, Schlegel was likely the most
credible of the three conspirators, and even with the Campbell affidavit, her
testimony still remains largely corroborated.

Because a jury could still

reasonably choose to believe her, Campbell's recantation does not so alter
the evidentiary picture that no reasonable jury could have convicted
Mulder.
In his brief, Mulder nevertheless argues that under Julian v. State, 2002
UT 61, 52 P.3d 1168, a newly discovered evidence claim does not
automatically fail when one wib1ess recants, but another does not. Aplt. Br.
17-19.

But Julian analyzed this question under the standard that existed
"under the post-conviction relief case law in effect prior to the enactment of
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the PCRA." Julian, 2002 UT 61, if 13 (emphasis added). Under that previous
standard, a petitioner was entitled to relief if there was "a substantial
likelihood of a different result on retrial."

Id. at if21.

Julian expressly

recognized that this was a lesser standard than the PCRA's current "no
reasonable h·ier of fact" standard. Id. at if17 (recognizing that under the
prior standard, the evidence "need not rise to the level of insuring that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty").
Under the current standard, however, a petitioner can obtain relief
only if no reasonable juror could still convict. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9104(1)(e)(iv). Here, a reasonable juror could choose to disregard Campbell's
recantation and convict Mulder based on all the other evidence, including
Schlegel' s sworn testimony. The district court therefore correctly dismissed
this claim under the governing standard.
In any event, even on its own terms, Julian does not compel a different
result. In dicta, Julian suggested that if a trial wih1ess later recants, that
recantation might satisfy the old newly discovered standard if the
recantation was able to "negate an essential elen1ent of the State's case" or be
used for "some other non-impeachment purpose." Julian, 2002 UT 61, ,l20
(emphasis added).

-22-

©

If there is inculpatory evidence from other sources, however, one
witness's recantation could not logically "negate" an essential element of
the State's case. In such a circumstance, the recantation' s value would thus
be limited to impeaching the prior testimony. This is the case here, where
Ca1npbell's recantation would have been counteracted by Schlegel's own
independent account, Mulder's admissions at trial that he was involved in
multiple aspects of this crime, and the physical evidence linking him to the
criine (such as the receipt showing that he pawned some of the coins stolen
during the robbery). Thus, even under Julian, this was not enough, and the
district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
II.

Appellate counsel could reasonably decide to not argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for not asking for a cautionary
instruction about the accomplices' testimony.
Mulder claimed below that his appellate counsel should have argued
that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a cautionary jury
insh·uction about testimony from Mulder's accomplices. PCR91-97.

The

dish·ict court denied this claim, concluding that (1) Mulder was not entitled
to such an instruction, and (2) its mnission did not prejudice hiln. PCR56566. Mulder challenges both aspects of that ruling. Aplt. Br. 22-26.
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A. To prevail, Mulder would have been required to prove
ineffective assistance of both appellate and trial counsel.

The PCRA provides the "sole remedy for any person who challenges
a conviction or sentence" following the conclusion of the direct appeal
process. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102 (West 2009). Under§ 78B-9-106(1)(c),
however, a petitioner is ineligible for relief on any claim that "could have
been but was not raised at h·ial or on appeal." If a clahn is barred under this
provision, however, the petitioner may still be eligible for relief if he shows
that "the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(3).
Here, Mulder claims that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel when appellate counsel did not raise each trial counsel
claim on direct appeal. See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, if 25, 293 P.3d 345; Gregg

v. State, 2012 UT 32, if 18, 279 P.3d 396 (to "succeed on an ineffective
assistance of counsel clahn in a post-conviction petition for relief," a
petitioner must "prove that he received ineffective assistance from both his
trial counsel and his appellate counsel" (Emphasis added.)).

To prove

ineffective assistance fr01n appellate counsel, Mulder was required to prove
"that appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonable conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced [hiln]."
Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, ~10, 290 P.3d 921 (citation 01nitted).
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To show deficient performance on the appellate counsel claim,
Mulder had to prove more than just that counsel overlooked a meritorious
clailn, because appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise
every non-frivolous issue.

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).

"Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on
one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Id. at 751-52.
That rule applies even when appellate counsel have the luxury of "no time
or page limits" because a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the
risk of burying good arguments." Id. at 753; accord Butterfield v. Cook, 817
P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, if a claim is meritless, appellate
counsel has no obligation to include it. See, e.g., State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1,
9jf 24 n.25, 322 P.3d 697.

To prove prejudice on this claim, Mulder was required to prove that
there was a "reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's um·easonable
failure ... , he would have prevailed on his appeal." Kell v. State, 2008 UT
62, ,I25, 194 P.3d 913 (citation orn.itted).

In other words, Mulder was

required to show that the omitted claim "'would have likely resulted in
reversal of his conviction."' Id.
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With respect to the underlying h·ial counsel claim, appellate counsel
would have been required to prove both deficient performance and
prejudice. To prove deficient performance, appellate counsel would have
been required to identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 690 (1984).

She would have had to overcome the "strong

presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; see also Burt v. Titlow, 134
S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). Appellate counsel would have had to meet the burden
"on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993); accord Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, 176, 344 P.3d 581
("Importantly, in assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient,
we must look at the facts and law available to counsel at the ti1ne of the
representation.").
To prove prejudice, appellate counsel would have had to prove that
@.

there was "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. He would have had to prove that the "likelihood of a
different result" was "substantial, not just conceivable."

Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Moreover, proof of prejudice "cannot be a

-26-

@.

speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Munguia,
2011 UT 5, ,I30, 253 P.3d 1082; accord State v. Bryant, 2012 UT App 264, if23,
290 P.3d 33.

B. The district court correctly denied this claim, where Mulder
was not entitled to the cautionary instruction at issue.

There are several reasons why the dish·ict court's ruling was correct.
First, appellate counsel properly omitted this claim because Mulder
was not so clearly entitled to an insh·uction that appellate counsel could
have shown that all objectively reasonable trial counsel would have asked
for it. Utah Code Annotated§ 77-17-7 (West 2004) states:
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice.

(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may
be given to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction
shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or hnprobable.
(Em.phasis added).
Here, the accomplice testin1ony was corroborated.

As an initial

matter, there was testimony from two accomplices (Schlegel and Campbell),
not just one. While both were accomplices, the statute refers to the
testimony of "the accon1plice" in the singular.
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The plain language

implication is that a cautionary instruction is not warranted if there 1s
testimony from multiple accomplices.
Moreover, Mulder himself corroborated much of their testimony.
Mulder admitted that he was in the Allgood coin shop several times with
Schlegel before the crime, that he met with Campbell a few weeks before the
robbery, and that he was with Schlegel and Campbell when the idea of
robbing the store came up.

R255:556-65.

He admitted that he helped

Campbell obtain a disguise for the robbery and that he was with Campbell
as he donned his disguise that morning. R255:573, 581, 583-94, 610. Mulder
admitted that he received some of the stolen coins after the robbery,
pawned one of then1 two days after the robbery, and later purchased
Campbell's remaining coins. R255:605, 631-32. The State also introduced
corroborating physical evidence, such as receipts showing that Mulder had
sold the gold coin. R254:377.
Moreover, the statute only requires a court to give an instruction if
the judge "finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory,
uncertain or ilnprobable." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-7. Neither accomplice's
testin1ony 1net this standard. Therefore, even if Mulder's trial counsel had
requested the instruction, the trial court still retained discretion not to give
it.

-28-

@

Second, Mulder also has not shown that appellate counsel could have
proven Strickland prejudice on the trial ineffective assistance claim. Utah
courts have repeatedly held that denying an accomplice-testimony
cautionary instruction did not prejudice a defendant, particularly where the
court instructed the jury to evaluate the witnesses' credibility and the
credibility concerns associated with the accomplice were discussed at trial.

See, e.g., State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Utah 1988); State v. Guzman,
2004 UT App 211, if37, 95 P.3d 302; State v. Kingston, 2002 UT App 103,

if 20,

46 P.3d 761.
This was the case here. The court explicitly instructed the jury to
II

consider any witness's possible bias or possible interest in the result of the
trial, and any possible motive the witness may have to testify in a particular
way." R197. The court also instructed the jury to consider whether any
witness had given

II

self-contradicting testimony or was conh·adicted by

other evidence." Id.
Mulder's trial counsel then repeatedly highlighted the self-interest of
both Schlegel and Campbell at h·ial. Counsel elicited testiinony that Schlegel
had received full ilnmunity for her testimony and that Campbell was
testifying pursuant to his own plea bargain as well. R253:90, 92, 108-09, 165;
254:354. Mulder's counsel also called one of Campbell's fellow inmates,
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who testified that Campbell had told him that he was testifying pursuant to
a deal, as well as an expert witness on prison culture who testified that it
would have been unlikely that Campbell would have testified without a
deal. R254:386, 428-29.
Given all this, a cautionary instruction "was simply not necessary to
prompt the jury to question [the] veracity" of these two accomplices,
because the testilnony had already "alerted the jury to [their] possible
motive[s] for testifying with less than total candor." Guzman, 2004 UT App
211, if37.

In short, on these undisputed facts, trial counsel could reasonably
conclude that the insh·uction was unwarranted or unlikely to be given.
Likewise, on this record, it is unlikely that its omission undermined
confidence in the outc01ne. The district court therefore correctly denied this
claim.
III.
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the
prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony from Lori
Schlegel.

At the preliminary hearing, Schlegel testified that she had never seen
Mulder with a gun.

R249:57-58.

At trial, she initially repeated this,

testifying that she had only seen Mulder with a stun gun, not the revolver
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that was used in the Allgood shooting.

R263:138.

During further

questioning, however, Schlegel said that she did recall helping Mulder
dispose of a gun several weeks after the crime. R255:470, 490. Despite this
change in testimony, Mulder's trial counsel did not argue to the judge that
the prosecutor had committed misconduct by knowingly presenting false
testimony. See generally R255:470-97.
In his post-conviction petition, Mulder argued that Schlegel' s later

testimony that she had seen Mulder with a gun was false; he further argued
that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel
should have alleged that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
knowingly presenting this false testimony. PCR108-10. The dish·ict court
denied this claim, concluding that because Mulder's claim was not
11

11

factually or legally correct," it was not ineffective assistance for appellate

counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal." PCR568.
That ruling was correct on several levels.
First, appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by mnitting this
claim, because the factual underpinnings for a prosecutorial n1isconduct
claim would not have been "obvious from the trial record." Kell, 2008 UT
62, if 42 (citation mnitted). To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim,
appellate counsel would have been required to demonstrate that the
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prosecutor was" aware that testhnony [was] false" but presented it anyway.

Larsen v. Davis Cnty., 2014 UT App 74, if4 n.3, 324 P.3d 641; accord State v.
Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, counsel would have
been obligated to do so based on the "facts ... available to counsel at the
time of the representation." Menzies, 2014 UT 40, if 76.
Here, Mulder has pointed to a contradiction in Schlegel' s testimony.
But "[c]onh·adictions and changes in a witness's testimony alone do not
constitute perjury and do not create an inference, let alone prove, that the
prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony." Tapia v. Tansy, 926
F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1991); accord Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1165,
1174 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019
(5th Cir. 1978) ("Presentation of a witness who recants or contradicts his
prior testimony is not to be confused with eliciting pe1jury."); United States

v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). Thus, her contradiction,
alone, would not have satisfied the standard.
Second, nothing in the record proves that the testimony Mulder
challenged (Schlegel' s later testhnony that she saw Mulder handle a gun)
was actually false. At h·ial: Ca1npbell testified that Mulder gave him the
gun that he used in the robbery.

R253:183-85. Like Schlegel, Campbell

testified that this gun was a six-shot revolver. R253:185; 255:490. Given
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this, appellate counsel could reasonably have decided not to press a
prosecutorial misconduct claim that would have required proof that this was
false.
Third, even if Schlegel did testify falsely, nothing in the record
suggests that the prosecutor knew this and yet presented her testimony
anyway. See Larsen, 2014 UT App 74, if4 n.3. Because of this, this claim
would not have been obvious from the record and appellate counsel had no
obligation to raise it.
Finally, Mulder's proffer failed as a matter of law to prove prejudice.
To prevail, appellate counsel would have been required to prove that the
error was "substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,I22, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted).
Here, the question involved in this claim would have been whether
Schlegel actually saw Mulder handle a gun. But as noted, there was also
testimony from Campbell corroborating Schlegel's claim that Mulder had a
gun. More ilnportantly, there was also an array of evidence showing that
Mulder was involved in the plam1ing and execution of this robbery and
murder. Given all of this, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have acquitted Mulder if it had not heard Schlegel say that she saw
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Mulder with a gun several weeks after this crime, and Mulder therefore has
not proven that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's decision to omit
this clahn. The dish·ict court therefore correctly denied this claim.
IV.

Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for not (1) questioning
prospective jurors about religion or (2) arguing that there was
an unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury.

·In his post-conviction petition, Mulder claimed that appellate counsel
was ineffective for not arguing that (1) Mulder's trial attorneys should have
asked the jury pool questions about their religion so that they could attempt
to ferret out religious-based bias against Mulder, and (2) there was an
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury. PCR30-44. The
district court rejected both claims, concluding that (1) "inquiry into religious
belief" would not have been permissible because religion was not "clearly
relevant"

to this case, and

(2) there was "no evidence of any

unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury." PCR562.
A. Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
trial counsel should have asked jurors about religion.

Mulder first faults his appellate counsel for failing to argue that trial
counsel was ineffective for not asking potential jurors about their religious
affiliation. Aplt. Br. 37-42. Mulder clahns that voir dire questions about
their religious affiliation were warranted because, as a "non-LDS member,"
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he was "part of a distinct minority group in Washington County" whose
"lifestyle conflict[ed] with LDS doctrine."

Aplt. Br. 38-39.

Mulder also

claims that LDS jurors would have been biased against him because the
victhn was an LDS bishop. Id.
But appellate counsel was not obligated to raise what would have
been a futile claim about trial counsel's performance during voir dire. nJury
selection is more art than science," and there "are a multitude of inherently
subjective factors typically constituting the sum and substance of an
attorneys' judgments about prospective jurors.'' State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, if 21, 12 P.3d 92. Because of this, a trial attorney's "decisions during jury
selection legitimately may be based on little 1nore than personal preference.
Defense counsel acting on their own intuitions, or upon their clients'
requests, clearly have the right to identify and prefer particular jurors
without regard to any particular objective criterion or philosophy of jury
selection." Id. at ~23.
While Mulder may now believe that his trial counsel should have
believed that me1nbers of the LDS Church were necessarily biased against
him, his counsel was not required to share that particular philosophy of jury
selection. The claim fails for this reason alone.

-35-

· In addition, even if trial counsel had believed that LDS members
would make bad jurors in this case, he 1nost likely would have been
precluded from getting into the jurors' religious affiliations because religion
was not a relevant inquiry. Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution
declares that no person shall be deemed "incmnpetent as a witness or juror
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof." Utah courts have
recognized that, in particular circumstances, religious beliefs might form
"the basis for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality'' for a particular juror.

State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). Because of
this, "inquiry into potential jurors' religious affiliation may occasionally be
permissible during voir dire" - but only when religion is" clearly relevant" to
the case. State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, if74, 256 P.3d 1102 (emphasis
added); accord State v. Flores, 2015 UT App 88, if if13-21, 784 Utah Adv. Rep.
12. If the "possibility of actual bias stemming from religious beliefs" is not
present in a case, "it is ordinarily inappropriate to inquire into venire
1nembers' religious beliefs during voir dire." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT
App 152, if 13, 71 P.3d 601.
In Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus

Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 931-34 (Utah App. 1988), for
example, a party was allowed to ask about the jurors' religious affiliation
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because the LDS Church was a party to the suit. In Depew, 2003 UT App
152, ili114-34, the plaintiff was likewise allowed to ask questions about
religion because the defendant was absent from trial serving an LDS
mission.
But as recognized by the district court below, religion was not
"clearly relevant" here.

PCR562.

As noted, Mulder's first claim is that

religion was clearly relevant because his "lifestyle conflict[ed] with LDS
doctrine." Aplt. Br. 38-39. Mulder provides little explanation for this in
either his petition or his appellate brief. So far as the State can tell, Mulder
appears to be arguing that his "lifestyle" made religion relevant because he
is not LDS. PCR37. But no Utah decision has held that this, alone, makes
religion "clearly relevant" to any case involving a non-Mormon.

Thus,

appellate counsel was not obligated to 1nake this claim. See Menzies, 2014
UT 40, ~76.

Alternatively, Mulder also seems to suggest that, because the jury
would hear that he met Campbell in prison, this "lifestyle" would be at
odds with the lifestyle of religious jurors. PCR37-42. But opposition to this
kind of "lifestyle" is not unique to 1nembers of any particular church, or
even to religious people at all. Atheists and agnostics would likely have
similar objections, because crime threatens all law-abiding citizens alike.

-37-

Obeying the law is a civic virtue, not a religious one, and religion there£ore
was not "clearly relevant" to the case. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,r74. 3
Mulder also claims that religion was relevant to this case because the
victim, Jordan Allgood, was an LDS bishop. Aplt. Br. 37-38. But contrary to
Mulder's claim, Allgood' s religious position did not 1nake religion clearly
relevant to this case. Allgood was not killed while he was at church or
while he was serving in some ecclesiastical capacity; rather, he was killed
while he was working at his coin shop.
Nothing in the record shows that Allgood's status as a bishop was
ever mentioned to the jury. The only reference in the record to Allgood' s
status as a bishop came during a pretrial hearing-well before jury selection
began-in which defense counsel mentioned to the court that Allgood ,,.,was
a Mormon bishop and well known in the community." R250:5. But in voir
dire, each prospective juror was asked whether they knew Allgood. No one
said that they did.
Despite this, Mulder insists that some juror 1nust have known about
Allgood's position, speculating that it is "common sense that in a small
town, people in that town know each other or know of each other" and that
3

If Mulder's argu1nent on this were accepted, it would theoretically
make religion relevant to any case involving a criminal, thereby allowing
this proposed exception to completely swallow the rule.
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s01ne juror likely knew that Allgood was a bishop. Aplt. Br. 40. But again,
all of these jurors stated on the record that they did not know Allgood.
Mulder's claim to the contrary is entirely speculative, and it therefore
cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance. See Munguia, 2011 UT 5,

if 30 (proof of prejudice "cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality").
In short, this record contains no reference to religion in front of the
Jury. Given this, religion was not clearly relevant to the case and Mulder's
trial counsel had no basis for asking prospective jurors about it. The district
court correctly denied this claim.

B. Appellate counsel had no basis for arguing that there was an
unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury.
Mulder also claims that appellate counsel should have argued that his
h·ial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the alleged exclusion of
non-Mormons from the jury. Aplt. Br. 14, 40-41. The district court rejected
this,

concluding

that

because

there

was

"no

evidence

of

any

unconstitutional exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury," appellate
:7\

\tjj/j1

counsel had no basis for raising th_is claim. PCR562.
The district courl was correct. After all, as tv1ulder himself recognizes,
prospective jurors were not asked about their religious affiliation. This is
the very basis for the first part of Mulder's claim. But if prospective jurors
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were not asked about their religion, then trial counsel and the trial court
would not have known who was (and was not) Mormon. On this record, it
therefore would not have been obvious to appellate counsel that there was
any exclusion of non-Mormons from the jury, and appellate counsel
therefore had no obligation to make what would have been an unsupported
claim. Kell, 2008 UT 62, ,I42.
On appeal, Mulder nevertheless argues that he did provide the
district court with some supporting evidence. He relies on a proffer he
made that another local attorney sometimes uses a jury questionnaire that
asks jurors questions about religious affiliation. Aplt. Br. 41. He extrapolates
r,,

that, because the jury questionnaire that was used in his case included no
religious-affiliation questions, his counsel may have been actively complicit
in ensuring that non-Monnons were excluded from this jury. Id.
But this speculation failed as a matter of law to provide a factual basis
for the claim-that non-Mormons were excluded. And again, because no
prospective jurors were asked about religious affiliation, there would have
been no way to prove that prospective jurors were excluded on this basis.
In any event, even if there had been evidence of such exclusion,
Mulder has not proven that appellate counsel even could have successfully
made this claim. Mulder's brief on this aspect of his clahn is somewhat
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unclear. So far as the State can tell, it appears that Mulder is claiming that
the alleged exclusion of non-Mormons was done through the use (or nonuse) of peremptory challenges, thereby bringing this under the auspices of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). But the United States Supreme
II

Court has never extended Batson to religion-based strikes, and there is no
clear consensus" among the states or federal circuits on whether Batson does
extend to religion-based strikes. United States v. De]esus, 347 F.3d 500, 509
n.7 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir.
II

2013) (recognizing that just one federal circuit and a handful of state courts
have extended Batson to strikes based on a juror's religious affiliation").
Utah's appellate courts have not yet ruled on this issue.
But to show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Mulder must
point to the "the law in effect at the time of trial." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228.
Because there was no conh·olling law extending Batson to religion at the
time of trial, neither h·ial nor appellate counsel would have a settled basis
for making this argument.

This provides an additional reason why the

appellate counsel claim fails.
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V.
Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for passing four jurors for cause.

Before trial, the parties submitted a stipulated 13-page proposed jury
questionnaire. Rl0l-114; see also R250:3. Given concerns about the pretrial
publicity, as well as the victim's standing in the conununity, the trial court
submitted the questionnaire to prospective jurors and then conducted an
extensive, two-day voir dire before selecting the jury. R152-54; 261-62.
In his petition, Mulder claimed that appellate counsel should have
challenged his trial counsel's decision to pass 11 jurors for cause. PCR51-75.
The district court rejected each of these arguments, concluding that
Mulder's "accusations" about the jurors did "not rise above the level of
'conspiracy theories,' speculation and reckless besmirching of individuals
and an entire community." PCR562.
On appeal, Mulder challenges this ruling with respect to four of the
challenged jurors: Lois Dainack, Kris Gubler, Shawna Holt, and Susan
Decorsey. Aplt. Br. 29-37.
A. To prevail, Mulder was required to prove that there was no
plausible reason for counsel's decision to not move to strike
each juror, as well as that each juror was actually biased.

Under rule 18(e)(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a juror must
be stricken where the juror's "conduct, responses, state of mind or other
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circumstances ... reaso~ably lead the court to conclude the juror is not
likely to act impartially."
Courts have interpreted this provision to require striking a juror who
is actually biased- i.e., who has "strong and deep impressions which will
close the mind against the testimony that will be offered," thus causing her
to "combat" any contrary testimony and "resist its force." State v. Ramos,
882 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted).

A juror must

therefore be stricken when her opinions or biases are "so strong or
unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process." State v. King, 2006 UT 3,
~23, 131 P.3d 202 (citation omitted). But where the juror only has "light
impressions" that would not "close the mind against testimony offered in
opposition," the juror need not be removed for cause. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d
1217, 1222 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Utah
1989).
As discussed, in any ineffective assistance clahn, trial counsel's
performance is only deficient if a defendant identifies specific acts or
omissions that could not constitute reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690.

When reviewing such a claim, an

appellate court "indulge[s] a sh·ong presu1nption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the

-43-

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id. at 689
(citation mnitted).

If any "conceivable" tactical basis for trial counsel's

actions exists, the claim fails. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I7, 89 P.3d 162.
In Litherland, the Utah Supreme Court applied this to a claim that was
based on counsel's failure to object to a particular juror. 2000 UT 76, if20.
The court recognized two "distinct presumptions" that apply to such cases.
"First, trial counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to remove, a particular
juror is presumed to be the product of a conscious choice or preference.
This follows from the general presumptions imposed by Strickland and from
the fact that a conscious refusal to object to or remove a particular juror may
be manifested by nothing more than silence in many circumstances." Id.
"Second, because the process of jury selection is a highly subjective,
judgmental, and intuitive process, trial counsel's presumably conscious and
strategic choke to refrain from removing a particular juror is further
presumed to constitute effective representation." Id.
"Consequently, because Strickland requires the presu1nption that trial
counsel's strategic decisions are reasonable, and because h·ial counsel is
justified in relying on little more than subjective preference for retaining a
particular juror, it follows that the decision not to remove a particular juror
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need only be plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is
ordinarily presumed." Id. at ,I25.
A petitioner may overcome the double presumption only by proving:
"(1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury

selection process that the failure to remove a prospective juror was not the
product of conscious choice or preference;" "(2) that a prospective juror
expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing
subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror;" or "(3) that
there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's
choice was not plausibly justifiable." Id.; accord Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12,
,I,I74-75, 156 P.3d 739.
In addition to proving deficient performance, Mulder was also

required to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficient
performance. To do show ineffective-assistance based prejudice in the juror
selection context, a petitioner must show that an actually biased juror sat on
the jury. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000); State

v. King, 2008 UT 54, ,I39, 190 P.3d 1283; State v. Arriaga, 2012 UT App 295,
,I13, 288 P.3d 588.

As with any other kind of ineffective assistance clain1, a petitioner
1nust prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Because of this, if it
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is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice," this Court may do so "without analyzing whether
counsel's performance was professional umeasonable." Archuleta, 2011 UT
73, if 41 (citation omitted).

Q

B. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Lois Dainack.

Mulder first challenges trial counsel's decision not to challenge Lois
Dainack for cause. Aplt. Br. 29-32. Mulder argues that Dainack should
have been stricken because (1) she had worked as a prison nurse; (2) "she
had once been the victim of a similar crime"; (3) a statement she made in her
jury questionnaire suggested that she found police officers to be 1nore
credible; and (4) "a statement that she made regarding her husband who
was once a N.Y. police officer" suggested that she was sympathetic to law
enforcement. Aplt. Br. 29.
1. Mulder did not prove that Dainack was actually biased.

As noted, Mulder was required to prove both deficient performance
and prejudice. Mulder did not prove prejudice because none of the grounds
he identified demonstrated that Dainack was actually biased.
Dainack' s past employment as a prison nurse:

In her jury

questionnaire, Lois Dainack stated that she had previously worked as a
prison nurse. See PCR444. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel initially
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agreed that she should be stricken for cause on this basis. R262:156. But
after extensive questioning in chambers, both passed her for cause.
R262:165-66, 179.
Contrary to Mulder's claim, her past employment does not show that
she was actually biased. To the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah Court of Appeals have both "upheld denials of motions to strike law
enforcement pers01mel for cause when questioning on voir dire dispels any
suggestion of bias raised by the prospective juror's law enforcement
background."

Ramos, 882 P.2d at 152; see also Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127;

Coggeshell v. State, 2011 UT App 375, ~6, 265 P.3d 818 ("law enforcement
personnel are not autmnatically disqualified from jury duty in a criminal
case").
In Ramos, for example, the court of appeals concluded that a juror was
not biased even though the juror had worked as a police dispatcher for 20
years. 882 P.2d at 152. In Gray, the court of appeals similarly passed a juror
who had worked as a highway patrolman for four years. 851 P.2d at 1223.
And in Cobb, the supreme court passed a juror who had worked as a police
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officer with two different departments over the space of 2 years. 774 P.2d at
1127. 4

This occurred here. During voir dire, Dainack explained that she had
worked for 6 years as a prison nurse in the 1naximum security prison in
New York. R262:157. She then repeatedly stated that this experience would
not prejudice her in either direction when evaluating this case. R262:159-60.
Dainack explained: "I think that every person has a right to being heard [on]
all sides of whatever crime has been committed, and then a judgment made
from that." R262:160. She further explained that as a medical professional
in a prison, she had an obligation to treat all prisoners fairly, and that she
had "tried not to become personal and take - make personal opinions over
... these inmates that came into our unit." R262:160.
After Dainack left the court's chambers, defense counsel stated that
after observing her and hearing her answers on the subject, he believed that
she had been honest and had "an open mind." R262:165. The trial court
agreed, stating that Dainack appeared "quite professional" and seern.ed
"very even handed." R262:166-67.

4

Mulder nevertheless points to several Colorado decisions that
apparently require automatic exclusion of prior law enforcement personnel.
Aplt. Br. 30. But as the above-cited cases demonstrate, this is not the rule in
Utah.
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Given this, Dainack' s past service working in a prison- as a nurse,
not a corrections officer- provided no basis for determining that she was
actually biased.
Dainack' s past crime victimization: Mulder raised and argued this

claim below, but his briefing on appeal is limited to a single sentence. See
Aplt. Br. 29. In his brief, he provides no record support for the claim, nor
does he offer any legal analysis of it. It is therefore inadequately briefed and
should not be considered. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
In any event, if reached, it fails.

A "potential juror's prior

victimization does not mandate the juror be removed for cause." State v.

Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d
461, 469 (Utah App. 1993) ("We are unaware of . . . any rule that
automatically disqualifies prospective jurors who have been, or have friends
or relatives who have been, victims of crimes similar to those at issue in the
case where they might sit as jurors.").
While such an experience might raise an inference of bias, the
inference can be rebutted. "This is generally accomplished by the trial court
sirnply asking if the juror can be in1partial." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823
(Utah App. 1994). "If, after probing the prospective juror's state of mind,
the h·ial court is satisfied that the juror can view and weigh the evidence
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impartially, the inquiry is at an end."

Id.

Utah courts have therefore

repeatedly upheld trial court decisions that a juror who had been victimized
in similar crime was still impartial. See, e.g., Wach, 2001 UT 35, ,I,I28-31;

Brooks, 868 P.2d at 823; Boyatt, 854 P.2d at 553; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469;
Here, when Dainack was questioned about this in chambers, she
explained that she had been burglarized 18-20 years earlier in Nevada.
R262:161. She said that she felt "a little violated" at the time, but that she
could evaluate this case fairly despite that experience.

R262:161-63.

Dainack explained that she had not only had time to "get over [it]," but also
that she had a "brother who went to prison for burglary."

R262:163.

Dainack said: "I love my brother," and accordingly stressed that she would
have to "know [the] circumstances" before judging someone else who
allegedly committed such a crime. Id. Thus, regardless of whether her own
experiences created an inference of bias, Dainack was sufficiently
rehabilitated.
Dainack' s statement about police officers: In the written jury

questioru1aire, jurors were asked: "Do you agree/ disagree with the
following statement: 'A police officer's testimony in court should receive
1nore or less weight, be given more or less credibility, than the testimony of
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a. non-police officer."'

PCR444.

In response, Dainack wrote: "More

credible-He holds a position of authority, should be honest." Id.
Mulder claims that this demonstrated that Dainack was actually
biased. Aplt. Br. 30-31. But again, the question is whether her alleged bias
was "so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint the trial process," King,
2006 UT 3,

if 23, i.e., whether her opinions would "close the mind against

testimony offered in opposition." Gray, 851 P.2d at 1222.
In her written questionnaire, however, Dainack stated that she
thought she "would be a good juror because [she] would not make a
decision until" she had "heard all the facts." PCR446. She expressly agreed
with the statement that because "[o]ne of the basic principles of American
law is that a person cannot be convicted unless the prosecution proves the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt," Mulder "is considered not guilty as he
sits here," and she did not need to "hear anything to find him not guilty."
PCR447.
Then, during vou dire, Dainack' s individual questioning and
counsel's on-the-record discussion about her was extensive-it spanned 23
pages of h·anscript.

See R262:156-79.

During that discussion, defense

counsel heard Dainack state that, because of her experiences working in
prison, she firmly believed that "every person has a right to being heard all
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sides of whatever crime has been committed and then a judgment made
from that." R262:160. Counsel also heard her stress that her brother had
committed a burglary, that she loved him, and that that influenced her
perspective on judging someone. R262:163.
At the conclusion of this discussion, defense counsel remarked on the
II

record that he thought she was honest and had an open 1nind." R262:165.
II

The court agreed, stating that she seemed quite professional" and "very
even handed." R262:167.
Given this, Mulder has not demonstrated that this isolated answer
from the jury questionnaire proved that Dainack was actually biased.
Dainack's comment about her husband:

During questioning,

Dainack was asked whether her deceased husband had worked for law
enforcement.

R262:171.

She explained that he had been a traffic patrol

officer in New York, but that he had left that job almost thirty years
previously. R262:172. When defense counsel joked that her husband had
been a "smoky bear on the turnpike," Dainack responded: "Yeah. One of
New York's finest." Id.
Based on this exchange, Mulder argues that appellate counsel should
have argued that trial counsel should have moved to strike her for cause.
But contrary to Mulder's assertion, the term "New York's finest" does not
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1:·.,

\i/V

appear to have been Dainack' s unqualified value judgment about all law
enforcement; rather, it is more correctly understood as a reference to the
common

nickname

for

New

York

police

officers.

See,

http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/New_York_City _Police_Department

e.g.
(last

visited June 3, 2015) ("Members of the NYPD are frequently referred to by
politicians, some media, and their own police cars by the nickname New

York's Finest.").

In any event, even if this offhand comment somehow

created an inference of bias, Dainack was rehabilitated. When the court
asked Dainack a follow up question about her husband, she stated that
"there was nothing about being married to him" that would impact her
thinking about this case. R262:172. This isolated com1nent provides no
basis for concluding that Dainack was actually biased.
2. Mulder also has not demonstrated that his counsel had no
plausible reason for wanting to keep Dainack on this jury.

As noted, Mulder must also prove deficient performance.

In this

context, he 1nust overcome Litherland's double presumption, which requires
him to demonstrate, in part, that counsel could not have had any "plausible
countervailing subjective preference" for retaining her. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, 7J25.
Mulder has not done this.

As discussed above, Dainack was

thoroughly vetted during voir dire, during which Dainack reaffirmed her
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ability to judge fairly and even gave specific reasons for doing so including her positive experiences working with inmates, as well her love
for a brother who had run afoul of the law.

See R262:160-63.

Defense

counsel was an active participant in that voir dire and had the opportunity
to observe Dainack firsthand. Mulder therefore did not show that there was
no plausible basis for the decision not to challenge her, and the district court
therefore correctly dismissed this claim on this basis as well. 5
C. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Kris Gubler.

Defense counsel passed Kris Gubler for cause and Gubler ultimately
sat on the jury. R261:162. Mulder now claims that appellate counsel should
have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to strike
Gubler because: (1) Gubler was an LDS bishop, (2) Gubler was once a
military police officer, and also had relatives who are officers. Aplt. Br. 33-

5

In passing, Mulder also claims that under Litherland's second prong,
his counsel was "so inattentive or indifferent during the jury selection
process" regarding Dainack that the failure to remove a prospective juror
was not the product of conscious choice or preference." Aplt. Br. 31-32; see
also Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~25. But such a claiin is "defeat[ed]" where the
transcript shows that trial counsel questioned prospective jurors during voir
dire. Taylor, 2007 UT 12, ,I84. Here, Mulder's trial counsel was actively
engaged throughout the voir dire process. Mulder's attorneys propounded
a 12-page jury questionnaire to all prospective jurors in advance of trial, and
both of his attorneys actively participated in the questioning of the
prospective individual jurors throughout the two days of voir dire. See
R261-62. This included the discussion about Dainack. See R262:156-79.
II
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35. Mulder also claimed that he is entitled to relief because the transcript of
Gubler' s individual voir dire is incomplete. Id.
1. Mulder did not prove that Gubler was actually biased.

Gubler's status as a bishop: As noted above, religion was not an

issue in this case, and nothing in this record demonsh·ates that it actually
impacted Gubler' s ability to fairly evaluate Mulder's guilt or innocence.
Mulder has not shown otherwise. Instead, he 1nerely speculates that
Gubler might have known Allgood because both were LDS bishops. But he
points to nothing in the record which supports this. There was accordingly
no evidentiary basis to establish that Gubler was actually biased against
Mulder because of his ecclesiastical position. See Munguia, 2011 UT 5, if30
(proof of prejudice "cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality").
Gubler's connections to law enforcement: Mulder also claims that

Gubler was actually biased because of his prior service as a military police
officer, and also because Gubler had family 1nembers who are police
officers. Aplt. Br. 33-35.
The record does not support this claim. with respect to Gubler' s own
alleged service. In his questionnaire, Gubler specifically stated that he had
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not served in the military, and he separately noted that he had never been
"in the military police." PCR426-27.
Nor do the alleged family connections establish actual bias. As noted
above, a potential juror's own service as a police officer does not
automatically disqualify him from jury service. See Ramos, 882 P.2d at 152;

Gray, 851 P.2d at 1223. This principle also applies when the prospective
juror has family members who are police officers. See, e.g., Wach, 2001 UT
35, if41 (rejecting a bias claim that was based on one of the jurors being
related to a police officer).
Transcript: Finally, Mulder attempts to overcome the lack of record

support for his actual bias claim against Gubler by claiming that his
conviction should have been set aside under State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439
(Utah 1983). Aplt. Br. 33-35. Mulder's argmnent fails for two reasons.
First, Taylor involved a situation like this one in which the transcript
from voir dire was incomplete in the appellate record.

But that case is

inapposite because the claim at issue in Taylor was a preserved claim that
was raised on direct appeal. Here, however, Mulder's claim arises in the
context of a
performance.

post-conviction challenge

to his

appellate counsel's

Thus, unlike Taylor, Mulder cannot prevail by simply

showing that there was some error; rather, Mulder must overcome a strong
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presumption that his counsel performed competently. And in the particular
context of a failure to move to strike a particular juror, silence alone is not
enough. Instead, "a conscious refusal to object to or remove a particular
juror may be manifested by nothing more than silence in many
circumstances." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, -J20.

Taylor therefore does not

support Mulder's request for reversal based on nothing more than an
incomplete transcription.
Second, even on its own terms, Taylor does not support Mulder's
claim. The conviction in Taylor was set aside because of the broad scope of
the transcription error-specifically, the voir dire record in that case was so
inadequate that the juror's answers were "totally absent from the record."

Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447. That is not the case here, where the record contains
Gubler' s questimmaire, portions

of Gubler' s voir

dire, and

most

significantly, the conclusion of both defense counsel and the court that
Gubler was not biased. See R261:162 (defense counsel and the court passing
Gubler for cause).
Moreover, Taylor did not require the conviction to be set aside
because of the h·anscription error alone. Rather, Taylor required reversal
because the transcription error in question involved prospective jurors
whose impartiality was already in question, and because there was a
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cognizable claim that the trial court had not permitted further questioning
to explore the bias- thereby rebutting the inference that counsel had
strategically chosen to pass the jurors for cause. See Taylor, 664 P.2d at 44547. Subsequent Utah decisions have recognized this, refusing to set aside
convictions based on an incomplete voir dire h anscript if the record also
4

showed that counsel chose to pass the jurors in question.

See State v.

Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,I,I34-36, 28 P.3d 1278; State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557,

559-60 (Utah App. 1996).

Here, Mulder has not shown that Gubler' s

impartiality was ever in question, nor has he shown that the trial court ever
prevented his counsel from asking Gubler any questions to explore the
alleged bias. Taylor therefore does not require reversal.
2. Mulder also has not demonstrated that his counsel had no
plausible reason for wanting to keep Gubler on this jury.

Again, even if defense counsel could have moved to strike Gubler for
cause, this does not mean that counsel was required to. Instead, Mulder
must show that Gubler "expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no
plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to
remove that juror." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,i2s.
Although the transcript of Gubler' s vou dire is admittedly
incomplete, his questionnaire gives ample reason why counsel could have
thought that Gubler would be a good juror.
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When Gubler was asked

@

whether it was more important to him "that the innocent be acquitted or
that the guilty be convicted," Gubler stated that it was more important to
him that the "innocent be acquitted."

PCR433.

Gubler stated that he

understood the presumption of innocence and was comfortable with the
idea that he did not need to "hear anything to find [Mulder] not guilty." Id.
Gubler also expressed a willingness to "completely set aside" any prior
opinions about the case and "render [his] decision only based on the
evidence presented during the trial." PCR434.
Moreover, in his questionnaire, Gubler also acknowledged that he
had visited the jail before, explaining that he did so ..,in the capacity of a
LDS Bishop." PCR430. In this sense, counsel could have readily believed
that Gubler's service as a bishop would actually make him a sympathetic
juror, given that he had personal experience ministering to parishioners
who had been incarcerated.
Because of this, Mulder has not demonstrated that there was no
plausible basis for the decision not to challenge Gubler, and the district
court therefore correctly denied this claim on this basis as well.
D. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Shawna Holt.

Defense counsel passed Shawna Holt for cause and she sat on the
jury. R261:162; 262:276. Mulder argues that appellate counsel should have
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argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not striking her because she
said that she was friends with the wife of Judge James Shumate. Aplt. Br.
36.

First, Mulder has not shown actual bias.

Judge Shumate did not

preside over this case; Judge Rand Beacham did. Mulder points to no case
that holds that a juror cannot sit if she is friends with the spouse of a judge
who is not presiding over this case, nor does he explain how this would
have created actual bias this case. See id. Moreover, Holt was rehabilitated
about this potential issue. During voir dire, she was asked whether she had
"ever discussed the law in any way with Judge Shumate." She responded:
"Never." R262:272.
Second, Mulder points to nothing else in this record demonstrating
that Holt was prejudiced against him. He therefore cannot show that her
limited connection to the wife of a non-involved judge created a bias that
was "so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective
preference could justify failure to remove that juror." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,

il25.
E. Mulder did not carry his burden with respect to Susan
Decorsey.
Finally, Mulder argues that appellate counsel should have argued
that trial counsel should have moved to sh·ike Susan Decorsey because "she
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tried to secure employment with the police force and has a close friend with
the L.A.P.D." Aplt. Br. 36. Mulder cites no record support for his claim that
Decorsey did this, nor does he provide legal analysis about why these facts

(if true) would make Decorsey biased. This claim is thus inadequately
briefed and should be disregarded. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
In any event, as discussed, Utah precedent allows law enforcement
officers or their families to serve on juries. Mulder points to no authority,
and the State is aware of none, stating that people who have applied for law
enforcement positions or have friends who are in law enforcement cannot
serve. Because of this, he has not shown that she was actually biased, let
alone that trial counsel could have had no plausible countervailing reason
for wanting to keep her on this jury.
VI.

Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing additional
alibi witnesses.

In his petition, Mulder argued that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue that h·ial counsel should have subpoenaed additional
alibi wih1esses. See PCR112-15. Mulder relied on two letters-one from his
1nother, Pa h·icia Diepen, and one from her brother, Michael Smithallegedly written to his appellate counsel detailing their efforts to
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corroborate Mulder's claim that he was in Mesquite, rather than St. George,
at the time of the Allgood robbery and murder. 6
The district court ruled that these letters were "insufficient to
establish a valid alibi because they do not show that [Mulder] could not
have been at the crime scene on the day and at the time of the murder ....
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to
raise this issue on appeal." PCR568. The dish·ict court was correct.
First, appellate counsel could reasonably have chosen to omit this
claim because neither letter shows that Mulder's mother or uncle had
actually identifie<:I a viable alibi witness. In her letter, Diepen said that she
11

spoke with the people at Uncle Buck's and the Southwest Spirit" about
Mulder's alleged whereabouts at the time of the robbery and murder, but
she does not identify who any of these people are, let alone demonstrate
that they could have been subpoenaed at the time of Mulder's trial.
Addendum C. In his letter, Smith was even 1nore vague, stating only that
he had spoken with "potential witnesses" - but he provided no names,

6

As with the Campbell affidavit discussed above, these were
provided as attachments to the post-conviction petition but not included in
the appellate record. Mulder has provided them as attachments to his brief,
and the State does so as well as Addendmn C. See also Aplt. Br.,
Attachments J & K.
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contact information, or identifying information for any potential witness.

Id.
In addition to not identifying the missing witnesses, the letters don't
actually establish an alibi.

An alibi is a "defense based on the physical

impossibility of a defendant's guilt by placing the defendant in a location
other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time."

Black's Law

Dictionary, Alibi (9th ed. 2009). A "purported alibi which leaves it possible
for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all." State v. Romero, 554
P.2d 216,219 (Utah 1976).
In this case, Mulder's claim was that he never left Mesquite with
Campbell on the morning of the murder, but that he instead stayed behind
in Mesquite and tried selling jewelry to local merchants. See R255:590-93.
The two letters that Mulder relies on provide no ad1nissible proof of this.
At most, both contain secondhand accounts of what others may have said,
and therefore would have been inad1nissible hearsay.

Moreover, both

lacked specific detail that could have proven Mulder's claim. In her letter,
Diep en claimed that she visited two stores in Mesquite, showed pictures of
Mulder to "the people at both places," and talked to people who
"reme1nbered [Mulder] being there and what they talked about."
Addendum C.

@

But Diepen said nothing about locating any proof that

-63-

anyone remembered seeing Mulder in their stores on the morning of
N ove1nber 25, 2003, which would be necessary to support an actual alibi.

See id.
Smith's letter was similarly unhelpful. There, he said that when he
and Diepen visited the stores in Mesquite, "[w]hat we found was hopeful
but inconclusive due to the lack of physical proof that too much lapsed time
©

brings." Addendum C. Smith said that people remembered seeing Mulder
"in their places of business," but he never claimed that anyone specifically
remembered seeing Mulder in their business on the morning of November
25, 2003. Id.
These letters therefore did not create a viable alibi, because, even if
they were true, it was still possible that Mulder visited the stores on some
other day or time, rather than on the exact day and time in which Campbell
robbed and shot Jordan Allgood.

Thus, because it is still "possible for the

accused to be the guilty person," these affidavits created "no alibi at all."

Romero, 554 P.2d at 219.
In short, because Mulder does not point to any testilnony frmn any
identified wih1ess that could have proven that he could not have been in St.
George at the tilne of the n1urder, he has not shown that his appellate
counsel overlooked a claim that likely would have resulted in reversal.
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VII.

Appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to argue that
the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel.

Finally, Mulder argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not
arguing that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel
because Mulder's counsel prevented him from "present[ing] his theory of
the case." Aplt. Br. 46. The district court rejected this, ruling that Mulder's
"trial counsel did present [Mulder's] theory of the case at the trial, through
[Mulder's] own testimony." PCR566. The district court was correct.
"While an indigent defendant has a right to have counsel appointed
to represent him, he does not have a constitutional right to a lawyer other
than the one appointed, absent good cause." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270,
272 (Utah App. 1987). When "a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with
counsel, a trial court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints." State v. Lovell, 1999
UT 40, 127, 984 P.2d 382; see also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272.
Here, Mulder complained about his counsel to the trial court on two
occasions.

R. 82; R255:520.

But despite this, the court never replaced

counsel, nor is there any indication that it conducted a Purs~fell inquiry.
Failure to conduct such an investigation is per se error. See State v.

Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Utah App. 1998).
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But a defendant is not

entitled to reversal if the record is "sufficient to support the trial court's
determination that good cause did not exist for substitute counsel." State v.

Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, ,Il4, 27 P.3d 573; accord In re C.C., 2002 UT App
149, ,I13, 48 P.3d 244.
This was the case here. Mulder's dissatisfaction with his trial counsel
stemmed from their alleged unwillingness to present his preferred theory of
the case. See Aplt. Br. 45-49. Mulder's theory of the case was detailed in a
February 24, 2006, letter that he wrote to his counsel, which he attached to
his post-conviction petition. See PCR386. In that letter, Mulder alleged: that
the coin robbery was Schlegel' s idea, not his; that Schelegel tried
blackmailing him into robbing the store; that Mulder apparently agreed to

@

rob the store, but then secretly planned to stay in Mesquite and not
participate in the robbery; and that Campbell drove to St. George on his
own and robbed the store. See id.
This is exactly the story that Mulder presented at trial over a year
later. Mulder testified, and his counsel elicited this precise account during
his direct examination. See R255:556-608. Counsel also had an investigator
attempt to verify Mulder's claim that he stayed behind in Mesquite, and
that investigator testified that he was able to corroborate Mulder's
I

~'
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descriptions of the stores he allegedly visited and the people Mulder
allegedly spoke to. See generally R255:653-61.
Thus, whatever the extent of Mulder's conflict with counsel, that issue
did not end up mattering because Mulder's counsel later facilitated a direct
examination in which Mulder told the very story that he now claims he
wanted to present.

Mulder therefore was not prejudiced by appellate

counsel's omission of this claim, and the district court correctly denied it.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on June 8, 2015.
D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

SEAN

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-104 (West 2009) Grounds for relief - Retroactivity of rule

(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that
is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not 1nerely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the n1aterial evidence is not 1nerely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supre1ne Court, or the Utah Court of
Appeals after conviction and sentence beca1ne final on direct appeal, and that:
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or
(ii) the rule decrhninalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime
for which the petitioner was convicted.
(2) The court 111ay not grant relief fron1 a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outco1ne in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed
with the evidence and facts inh·oduced at trial or during sentencing.

(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title
78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction
Determination of Factual Innocence.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106 (West 2009) Preclusion of relief-Exception
(Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-35a-106)
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-h·ial 1notion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time,
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief,
unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or
procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise a procedural bar or time
bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Petitioner,

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil 'No. 100502932
Judge G. Rand Beacham

vs.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
This matter came before the Court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Petitioner's two remaining grounds for post-conviction relief: Ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel (which also incorporates Petitioner's previous claims) and newly discovered evidence.
Respondent's supporting memorandum consists of more than l 00 pages of print plus
attachments, and Petitioner's opposing memorandum consists of 49 pages of single-spaced
handwriting plus attachments. The Court heard oral arguments on the motion and took the matter
under advisement.
The Court notes that summary judgment is an awkward context for a case filed under the Post
Convictions Remedies Act. Ordinarily, the facts and inferences therefrom which are considered in
~

relation to a summary judgment motion are viewed and construed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. In this type of case, however, all factual issues must be resolved
"in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,

il 1 n. 1. Accordingly, the Court applies the standard for a case filed under the Post Convictions
Remedies Act.
Having fully considered the matter, the Court grants the Motion. The Court is persuaded
almost entirely by Respondent's arguments, and will not indulge in much analysis of those issues
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which are well-presented in the parties' memoranda. Due to caseload and time restraints, the Court
provides only the following summary of the issues and the Court's rulings:
1. Trial counsel's failure to challenge potential jurors
on the basis of religious beliefs or preferences was not
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
There are three reasons that Petitioner's claims fail. First, trial strategy is discretionary, and
failure to make religion an issue is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, the Utah
Constitution prohibits finding a juror incompetent "on account of religious belief or the absence
thereof." Inquiry into religious belief is permissible only where religion is "clearly relevant" to the
case. It was not in Petitioner's case. Third, there is no evidence of any unconstitutional exclusion
of non-Mormons from the jury. Petitioner relies on speculation, innuendo and falsehoods of which
the Court could take judicial notice. Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel
to fail to raise these issues on appeal.
2. Trial counsel's failure to challenge individual
jurors for cause was not ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
Challenges for cause must be granted only if a prospective juror is so strongly and
unequivocally biased "as to inevitably taint the trial process." The comis presume that failure to
object to a juror is a conscious choice by trial counsel and that it is effective representation, unless
the Petitioner shows that trial counsel was "so inattentive or indifferent" duringjury selection, or that
the juror was so biased, or that specific evidence shows counsel's choice was not plausibly
justifiable, that the presumption is overcome. Such evidence has not been presented. Petitioner's
accusations do not rise above the level of "conspiracy theories," speculation and reckless
besmirching of individuals and an entire community.
The record shows that trial counsel actively questioned prospective jurors during voir dire,

2

0562

and that Petitioner only speculates, without evidence, that trial counsel "purposely" selected a jury
~

of members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. There is no evidence before the
Court to establish such speculation as fact. Petitioner fails to show that any juror was actually and
impermissibly biased. The record shows that voir dire questioning established that there was no such
bias.
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues
on appeal.
3. Trial counsel's failure to argue for 12 peremptory
challenges was not ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
This was not a capital case, so Petitioner was not entitled to ten peremptory challenges. Rule
18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gave Petitioner the right to four challenges, plus those

i,;j)

related to alternate jurors. There is no legal basis for Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to
additional peremptory challenges because there were multiple charges. Therefore, it was not
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal.
4. Petitioner's claim based on newly discovered
evidence does not show that no reasonable trier of fact
could find him guilty if such evidence, with all other
evidence. were presented at a new trial.
Respondent's supporting memorandum made arguments on the assumption that Petitioner
was claiming that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was
ineffective because of trial counsel's failure to request a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. Tn those arguments, Respondent established three reasons that Petitioner could not make

such a claim.
Petitioner's opposing memorandum, however, clarified that his newly discovered evidence
claim was not related to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the arguments are
3
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considered under the standard of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9- l 04(1 )(e), which has four parts that
Petitioner must satisfy.
Petitioner also clarified that he offers the two affidavits of Daniel Campbell's fellow inmates
only to show how Petitioner became aware of Daniel Campbell's recantation of his trial testimony.
Petitioner does not suggest that these two affidavits are offered for the truth or falsity of Daniel
Campbell's statements to the affiants. Accordingly, the two affidavits are relevant only to the timing
of Petitioner's discovery of the newly discovered evidence in relation to §104(l)(e)(i), and appear
to show that Petitioner has met this requirment. The timing of Petitioner' discovery would not be
relevant to trial evidence if Petitioner's case were retried, however, so these two affidavits are not
©

considered in relation to whether Petitioner has met the requirements of§ I 04( 1)(e)(ii) through (iv).

1

Neither party has discussed adequately whether Petitioner has shov\rn that his newly
discovered evidence "is not merely cumulative of evidence that was lmown." For reasons stated
below, however, it is not necessary for the Court to rule as to § I 04(1 )(e)(ii).
With respect to whether the newly discovered evidence "is not merely impeaclnnent
evidence," the issue is whether Daniel Campbell's recantation and expected new testimony at a new
trial would actually constitute impeachment evidence.

That might depend on whether the

prosecution in a new trial would be allowed to introduce Daniel Can1pbell' s original trial testimony
before either pa11y called him for his new testimony. Regardless of when Daniel Campbell would
be called to testify at a new trial, whatever he testified there would be subject to impeaclunent with
his contradictory testimony-even ifhe there recanted his recantation. Neither pa1ty has discussed
this point adequately, however, and the Comt's ruling is not based on §104(1)(e)(iii).

In addition, Petitioner occasionally offers his own statements regarding his intentions at
the time of the crime. E.g., see Petitioner's memorandum pp. 22 and 27. Such statements are not
newly discovered evidence and are not considered for any purpose.
1

4

Ultimately, Petitioner's newly discovered evidence claims fails because he has not shown
ViJ

that "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that
no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense." Utah Code Ann.
§104(1)(e)(iv). 2 The purported new evidence of Daniel Campbell, who already testified against
Petitioner at the trial, would be contradictory both to the former trial testimony of Daniel Campbell
and Petitioner himself. Furthermore, this new evidence of Daniel Campbell would have little

Gt>

credibility because Daniel Campbell would clearly be admitting that he lied under oath at Petitioner's
first trial. Finally, the prosecution would still have the testimony of Lori Schlegel and the physical
evidence against Petitioner.
Consequently, when the Court considers the substance of this newly discovered evidence and
its probable weight at a new trial, the newly discovered evidence, viewed with all the other evidence,

~

certainly does not demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact would find Petitioner guilty.
5. Trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction
as to accomplice credibility was not ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Petitioner is incorrect as a matter of law in his suggestion that his conviction could not be
based on the testimonies of his accomplices without corroboration.
Furthermore, the accomplice testimony at Petitioner's trial came from two accomplices,
Daniel Campbell and Lori Schlegel, and the testimony of each accomplice corroborated that of the
other. In that circumstance, the trial court was not required to give a cautionary instruction and it

2

@

The phrasing of this statute suggests that the Court should imagine that the newly
discovered evidence had been given at the first trial, not that the Court should imagine what
effect the newly discovered evidence might have in a new trial. This would result in an odd
analysis, however, in which Daniel Campbell would have given his former trial testimony and
then have given his expected new testimony in the first trial. Rather than participate in such an
odd analysis, the Court will phrase this po11ion of its ruling in terms of the effect the newly
discovered evidence might have in a new trial.

5
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was not ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to request such an instruction.
In addition, while Petitioner quibbles about the testimony given by Lori Schlegel and Daniel
Campbell, Petitioner has not shown that the testimonies of his accomplices were so selfcontradictory, uncertain, or improbable as to require the Court to give a cautionary instruction, or
that the Court should have given one, so it was not ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to
request such an instruction.
Finally, Petitioner has not shown that an additional jury instruction as to accomplice

©

credibility would likely have resulted in a different verdict, because (a) the trial court did instruct the
jury as to the credibility of witnesses generally and (b) the questioning of Petitioner's accomplices
©

by his trial counsel fully identified for the jury the issues as to the credibility, motives, and potential
biases of those accomplices.
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues

@

on appeal.
6. Trial counsel's failure to request the appointment
of substitute counsel was not ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.
The reasons given by Petitioner for the appointment of substitute counsel did not and do not
constitute good cause for such an appointment. Petitioner's trial counsel did present Petitioner's
theory of the case at the trial, through Petitioner's own testimony. Petitioner's trial counsel also
presented the only alibi evidence that might have been obtained from the defense investigator.
Petitioner's trial counsel further presented the testimony of Joel Daugherty, a fellow inmate of Daniel
Campbell, in an effort to impeach Daniel Campbell's testimony. Nothing suggested by Petitioner
in this respect shows any likelihood of a different verdict. Therefore, it was not ineffective
assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal.

6
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7.
Trial counsel's stipulation to certain facts
regarding Daniel Campbell's crimes was not
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The written stipulation presented to the jury was clearly the result of a well-considered,
strategic decision by trial counsel, intended to avoid alarming the jury with the violent details of
Daniel Campbell's crimes and thereby inflame the jury about Petitioner's case. Nothing in the
written stipulation contradicted Petitioner's own trial testimony. Therefore, it was not ineffective
@

~

assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal.
8. Appellate counsel's failure to argue that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Daniel
Campbell adequately was not ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel because such an argument would
have been factually incorrect and ultimately futile.
First, the nature and relevant terms of Daniel Campbell's plea agreement, to a first degree

vi,

felony murder charge, were correctly and sufficiently presented to the jury. Testimony was given
by Daniel Campbell, Joel Daugherty, and another expert witness regarding "prison culture" and what
the jury might think of the testimony of a prison inmate such as Campbell
Second, trial counsel did question Joel Daugherty at trial about his purported conversation
with Daniel Campbell regarding Campbell's purported conversation with an unidentified prosecutor.

~

Petitioner fails to show that anything else could reasonably have been done with this evidence or that
it would likely have produced a different result.
Third, evidence of the purported promise of prosecutors to write a letter to the Board of
Pardons regarding Daniel Campbell's cooperation with the prosecution of Petitioner does not appear
in the appellate record, so it would not have been obvious to appellate counsel.
Finally, Campbell was impeached at length by trial counsel and Petitioner has failed to show
a reasonable probability that his verdict would have been different if the purpo1ied promise had been

7

presented to the jury.
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise these issues
on appeal.
9. A1mellate counsel's failure to argue that there was
prosecutorial misconduct was not ineffective
assistance.
This claim received ample discussion in the parties' memoranda. Simply put, Petitioner's
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are not shown to be factually or legally correct. Therefore, it was
not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal.

10. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
subpoena Petitioner's mother, uncle and other
unidentified persons as alibi witnesses.
The affidavits of the two proposed alibi witnesses are insufficient to establish a valid alibi,
because they do not show that Petitioner could not have been at the crime scene on the day and at
the time of the murder. The private investigator, whom Petitioner's trial counsel called as a witness
regarding Petitioner's alibi theory, admitted he found no evidence to support a valid alibi.
Petitioner's reference to unidentified persons who were not subpoenaed for alibi testimony fails to
meet his burden of producing facts to supp011 his claim for relief. Therefore, it was not ineffective
assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise this issue on appeal.
11. Appellate counsel's argument regarding a merger
of the aggravated kidnaping charge into the
aggravated robbery charge was not ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
Here Petitioner challenges what appellate counsel did do, rather that what appellate counsel

did not do. This claim also fails because, if the merger argument had prevailed, it may have
significantly reduced Petitioner's sentence, notwithstanding Petitioner's speculation to the contrary.
Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to raise this issue on appeal.

8
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Respondent's
counsel may submit an appropriate order and judgment.
~\--

Dated this-·~- day of October, 2012.
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Todd Wayne Mulder
Inmate No. 178178
Utah State Prison
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Ryan D. Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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MARGARET PRIM LINDSAY (6766)
P.O. Box 1058

Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801) 318-3194

TODD WAYNE MULDER,
Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DANIEL CAMPBELL

vs.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

I, DANIEL CA.lv.[PBELL, being first duly sworn according to law, onmy oath
depose and say:
1. I am an inmate of the Utah Department of Corrections, # 169017. I am
incarcerated for the robbery and death of Jordan Allgood. Todd Mulder was also
charged.

2. At Mulder's trial, I testified against him. I lied. Subsequently, I prepared a
handwritten, notarized affidavit explaining what had really happened and that I lied about
Mulder's involvement. This affidavit was prepared solely at my discretion. Nobody
asked me to write it. I did it freely and voluntarily. I have not been threatened or coerced
into making these statements. I have not seen Mulder since his trial, or spoken to him
since before our arrests.
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3. Mulder was wrongfully convicted of the charges sun-ounding the robbery and
death of Allgood. He was not present when I entered the store, did the robbery, shot-

Ajlgood, and left him han_dcuffed. While I had some discussion aboi.it robbin9,,, the
Allgood store with Mulder, he did not plan the robbery with me. His involvement

was

even less than Lori Schlegel's.
4. In addition, he did not drive me to St. George, Utah. I b~rrowed Schlegel' s
truck from Mulder and left him at a shopping complex in Mesquite, Nevada, so he could

sell some items; P.v D S:
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5. I understand that I could possibly be prosecuted for pe!]ury. However, what is
written in my handwritten affidavit and this one is the truth: I, alone, committed the
robbery and kidnapping of Jordan Allgood, and caused his death. I did not mention the
shooting of Allgood to Mulder or Schlegel when I returned to Mesquite. Schlegel and
Mulder did take possession a portion of the money and coins from the robbery, but that is

all.
DATED this /

f/ day of December, 2010.

dL-~ll?ANIEL

CAM"PBELL

SlJBSCRIBED .A-1'ID SWORN TO before me this /
ROSE MARiE VAN DYKE
NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF UTAH

My Commission Expires on:
February 23. 2014
Commission # 581628
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day of December, 2010.
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AddendumD

Addendum D
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-·--October 31, 2009

Atty: Margaret Lindsay
P.O. Box 1058
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Re: Todd W. Mulder#41299
Case #052501050
Dear Margaret,
Enclosed, please find a couple of pictures that I took with me to Utah when I
spoke with Modrae at Southwest Spirit and Jarred Noel of Uncle Buck's, the
two of the three places that my brother and I went to, to confirm that Todd was
in fact with these people. There was one other jewelry store that we went to,
but the owner wasn't there at that time. However, the people at both places
remembered Todd being there and what they talked about. Like I said on
the phone with you the other day, I am sure that Todd's attorney's were getting nervous with me being there, and what I might find out. In my estimation,
Todd's attorney's were working for the prosecution instead of Todd.
Also, enclosed is a copy of the letter, written and signed by Derek Clay #
40912 on the 24th of October, 2007, an inmate at Gunnison, stating that
Todd in fact had nothing to do with the robbery and murder of Mr. Jordan
Allgood in November of 2003.
On behalf of my son, Todd W. Mulder, I have to state with I do not believe
that Todd would ever hurt anyone. Yes, he has been in trouble before, as
you know, but, I cannot and will not believe that Todd is quilty in this case.
I think he was completely railroaded.
I sincerely hope that the enclosed will help you to understand Todd, and
believe him, as I do. If there is anything else I can do, just let me know,
and I'll do anything and everything I can to help prove his innocence.
Thank you so very much for taking the time to talk to me on the phone the
other day, it sure made me feel a little better about the situation, knowing
that someone like you is in charge.
Sincerely,
Patricia A. Diepen
150 Cortona Way #250
Brentwood, Ca. 94513
Phone: 925-513-4061
Please feel free to call me collect at anytime.

March 13, 2009
Trip to see Todd Mulder:
My sister Pat Diepen asked me to drive here to visit her son Todd in Utah. With
his location, she is not physically able to see him herself.
As Pat and I drove to Utah she told me the entire story of the events that
lead to Todd's incarceration. As the story unfolded, it became obvious the
official record on this case is not what happened. Regardless of the out
come of this hearing or the lack of evidence at this late date the delay has
worked a 100 fold against Todd's innocence in this crime.
I have known Todd since he was a baby and watched him grow up into a young
man, which unfortunately he got mixed up with the wrong kids. He's no Angel,
but he is also no killer. If you spend 10 minutes with Todd on any subject he is
alert, engaged and caring of the topic and discussion. He is intelligent, sincere
and any physiologist worth their salt can see he is not capable or better, to
intelligent for murder.
After Pat's visit with Todd, I suggested as a whim, more than anything, that
we visit the potential witnesses that could prove Todd's innocence. What we
found was hopeful but inconclusive due to the lack of physical proof that too
much lapsed time brings, remembered conversations, physical evidence (items
for sale or viewed), surveillance camera tapes etc. all that will prove he was at
these places.
Even after this totally negligent amount of valuable wasted time, individuals still
remembered him in their places of business. The only issue that was more
amazing to us is that no one recalls any investigation by anyone during the time
of the crimel Which, of course, proves Todd's innocence immediately.
I have not met, nor do I wish to meet the original investigators on this case, but
the disgrace they represent to the U.S. Criminal Justice System and shear
devastation dealt to my Sister and her Son is -CRIMINAL. If I ran my business
like they ran this investigation I would be out of business. Unfortunately, in this
case, an innocent man sits in prison for something he couldn't have done.
Has anyone looked closely at the individual's who where responsible for this
murder and honestly admit the character these people possess warrant's
credible judgment against any human being?
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Someone, please apply true justice to this case so this man can go home. My
sister has very little time left in this world, as her health has taken a major hit
from this injustice. Please move fast.
Under penalty of perjury, I swear that the information contained herein is true
and corre
the best of my knowledge.
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